From the Engineering of Promises to the Engineering of the State

Commentary

This note does not judge the programme on its intentions but on its capacity to be delivered. Its thesis fits in one phrase, the “paradox of the narrow mandate and the broad programme”: a programme designed for an absolute majority will have to be implemented by a coalition, on a limited electoral mandate and with a first budget prepared by the outgoing government.

Key takeaways

1. The programme’s annual cost (MAD 70 billion) alone exceeds the authorised deficit: every new expense requires a new resource.
2. The MAD 300 billion “growth dividend” is only reached if one assumes a near-stagnant economy without the programme.
3. The one-million-jobs target relies on an elasticity eight times higher than the one the programme’s own figures show for 2022–2025.
4. Everything is decided in the first hundred days: a majority pact designed as a delivery contract, a public financial annex in three scenarios, and a delivery unit focused on ten commitments.

Who this text is for

Policy-makers, economic journalists, public policy researchers and political science students.

Abstract

This study assesses the implementability of the Authenticity and Modernity Party’s (PAM) 2027–2031 programme in Morocco through the lens of implementation theory. Drawing on the party’s official programme, the 2027 budget framework and High Commission for Planning data, it finds that the claimed MAD 300 billion growth dividend implies a counterfactual growth rate of only 1.3–2%, and that the one-million-net-jobs target assumes an employment elasticity eight times higher than observed in 2022–2025. It proposes a delivery architecture and four scenarios for 2031.